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This essay about the 1267 Security Council sanctions regime discusses the legal limitations to 
the powers conferred to the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the 
implications in relation to international human rights standards. It holds the opinion that the 
Security Council has taken on a quasi-judicial role, while its procedures continue to fall short of 
the fundamental principles of the right to fair trial as reflected in international human rights 
treaties and customary international law. In particular it addresses the question of judicial review 
of sanctions in light of the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson, first mandated 
under Resolution 1904 to receive requests for delisting from the 1267 ‘Consolidated List’ and 
the implications of the recent split between the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regimes through 
Resolutions 1988 and 1989. In its final section the essay analyses the recent Kadi II judgment by 
the General Court of the European Union (EGC) and concludes that, while effective judicial 
procedures for review are necessary but deficient in the 1267 regime also in its current form, the 
requirement of the EGC of disclosure of full evidence appears to present particular challenges in 
this respect. 
 
In the assessment of the authors, although Resolution 1989 does not deliver what critics, 
including the EGC have wanted, it may, if properly implemented, provide one important element 
of what is actually needed to reach an acceptable arrangement of due process in the Al-Qaida 
sanctions regime, due to the prospect that the Ombudsperson will de facto have a decisive role in 
delisting. This prospect, however, does not flow automatically from Resolution 1989 but will 
require also political commitment. 
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1.  The 1267 Sanctions Committee and the Powers of the UN Security Council 
 
The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee was established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1267 (1999)
1
 for the purpose of overseeing the implementation of sanctions imposed 
on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for its support and harbouring of Osama bin Laden. The 1267 
sanctions regime has been modified by subsequent resolutions,
2
 all adopted under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, including Resolutions 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011), which recently split the Al-
Qaida and Taliban sanctions system into two separate regimes, a country-specific regime 
                                                          
* This essay builds upon and updates a report to the General Assembly on how the United Nations organization 
complies with human rights while countering terrorism, submitted by the second author in his capacity as Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism 
(UN Doc. A/65/258). The first author assisted the second one in the research for, and drafting of, the report. 
1
 Security Council Resolution 1267, UN Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999). 
2
 Including Security Council Resolutions 1333 (200, 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1536 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 
(2006), 1822 (2008), 1904 (2009 and 1989 (2011).  
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imposing sanctions on those Taliban ‘constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of 
Afghanistan’,3 and the 1267 sanctions measures, which apply to designated individuals and 
entities associated with Al-Qaida wherever located.4 In addition to overseeing States’ 
implementation of the sanctions measures, the 1267 Committee maintains a list of individuals 
and entities belonging to or associated with Al-Qaida (‘the Al-Qaida Sanctions List’) to whom 
the sanctions are to be applied. Once the name of an individual or an organization is placed on 
the list, through initiative by any Security Council member and a quick tacit approval by other 
members, all States have the obligation to freeze the assets of the designated person/organization 
and ban their travel. 
 
It remains contested whether the 1267 regime, in its current form, is compatible with the powers 
of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In particular, concerns followed 
Security Council Resolution 1390 (2002),
 5
 which was adopted following the defeat of the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan to modify the 1267 regime, and constitutes the first example of an 
open-ended sanctions resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, without any link to a 
specific territory or State. The original Resolution 1267 could be seen as a temporary emergency 
measure by the Security Council, using its Chapter VII powers to address a specific threat to 
peace and security, and the specific circumstance of the Taliban exercising de facto power in 
Afghanistan justifying sanctions being imposed on the Taliban and not a State. However with the 
shift to a sanctions regime resulting in a global list of persons associated with the Taliban or Al-
Qaida, and subjecting individuals to sanctions of potentially indefinite duration, the regime was 
no longer limited in time or space, and its relationship to a specified threat to peace and security 
can be contested. While the new Taliban sanctions regime under Resolution 1988 (2011) now 
shifts back to a country-specific temporary emergency measure, it still presents a considerable 
number of human rights shortcomings that will not be addressed here.6 Simultaneously the 
current 1267 Al-Qaida sanctions regime modified by Resolution 1989 (2011) takes important 
steps towards due process and independent review but is unlimited in space and time and thereby 
continues to pose a number of problems under United Nations law. 
 
 As an organ of an international organization, the Security Council is bound by its constituent 
instrument, the United Nations Charter. The Charter, in particular its Chapter VII, provides the 
foundation for and limit to action by the Security Council. Moreover, Article 24(2) demands that 
the Council act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations which 
include, in Article 1(3), the promotion of and respect for human rights when discharging its 
duties. Article 39 of the Charter regulates the determination by the Security Council of the 
existence of a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression. On the basis of this 
determination, the Council may decide what measures may be taken to maintain or restore 
international peace and security, including measures not involving the use of armed force, under 
Article 41 of the Charter.  
 
While the Council is granted a great deal of discretion to determine what amounts to a threat to 
peace, scholars have argued that this determination must always be linked to a specific concrete 
                                                          
3
Security Council Resolution 1988, UN Doc. S/RES/1988 (2011) 
4
 Security Council Resolution 1989, UN Doc. S/RES/1989 (2011) 
5
 Security Council Resolution 1390, UN Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002) 
6
 Notably, the delisting criteria in paragraph 18 of resolution 1988 are openly political, and the Delisting 
Ombusperson established under resolution 1904 does not have any role under resolution 1988 (2011), fn.3. 
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situation.
7
 The Council should use its exceptional powers solely to take measures deemed 
indispensable to countering a specific concrete situation that is posing a threat to international 
peace and security. Moreover, measures taken by the Council under Chapter VII should be taken 
on a case-by-case basis according to the principle of proportionality.  The inherent limits to the 
exercise of the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII for counter-terrorism purposes 
are even more pressing in the light of the persistent problem of the lack of a universal, 
comprehensive and precise definition of ‘terrorism’.8 While acts of terrorism remain atrocious 
crimes, the abstract phenomenon of international terrorism is not, on its own, a permanent threat 
to peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. Compared to the situation at the time of 
the adoption of Resolution 1267 (1999) or Resolution 1373 (2001)
9
, the rapid progress in State 
ratifications of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
nowadays provides a proper legal basis for States’ obligations in the field of countering 
financing of terrorism.  
 
In its current form, the sanctions regime of the Security Council has been said to have judicial or 
‘quasi-judicial’ character.10 The Security Council is thereby exercising supranational sanctioning 
powers over individuals and entities, through a permanent global terrorist list. In legal doctrine, 
there is wide support for a narrow understanding of the judicial or quasi-judicial powers the 
Security Council can exercise under Chapter VII. Such powers are difficult to reconcile with the 
legal order of the UN Charter,
11
 and with the provisions of Article 41 of the Charter.
12
 In cases of 
doubt, legal determinations by the Security Council should always be limited to a particular 
situation and should be interpreted as being of a preliminary rather than a final character.
13
  
 
Further, if the Security Council is to take on such quasi-judicial functions, it is proper to require 
that it must observe the procedural requirements universally applied to courts and tribunals, or at 
least guarantee an equivalent level of due process.
14
 In the case of the 1267 regime, it is essential 
for the Security Council to uphold all relevant due process rights when imposing sanctions on 
individuals. In this respect, targeted sanctions under the 1267 regime have come under frequent 
                                                          
7
 See Matthew Happold, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and the Constitution of the United Nations’, 
(2003) Leiden Journal of International Law 16; Valeria Santori, ‘The United Nations Security Council’s (broad) 
Interpretation of the Notion of the Threat to Peace in Counter-Terrorism’, in Giuseppi Nesi (ed.) International 
Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism: The United Nations and Regional Organizations in the Fight Against Terrorism 
(Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006). 
8
 The issue of a draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism was referred in 2001 to the Ad Hoc 
Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 and continues to be pursued 
by states, including after the call by the General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome (Resolution 60/1) 
for the adoption of the convention by the General Assembly during its sixtieth session. 
9
 Security Council Resolution 1373, UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) 
10
 Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 
pp. 352-354. 
11
 Article 92 of the UN Charter clearly identifies the International Court of Justice as ‘the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations’ (United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, (1945) Article 92). In relation to the Security 
Council, Harper asked: ‘Should such a political institution, conferred with executive powers, answer purely juridical 
questions […] when there are appropriate fora for the adjudication of such issues?’, in Keith Harper, ‘Does the 
United Nations Security Council Have the Competence to Act as Court and Legislature?’, (1994) New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 27, p. 135.  
12
 Although Article 41 is phrased in permissive terms, it does not envisage the Council making legal determinations.  
13
 See Jochen Frowein and Nico Krisch, ‘Introduction to Chapter VII’ in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 708.  
14
 Keith Harper, ‘Does the United Nations Security Council Have the Competence to Act as Court and Legislature?’, 
(1996) p. 106. See fn. 8. 
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criticism for their human rights shortcomings, by legal scholars and reports commissioned by 
international organizations,
15
 and they have been challenged indirectly in legal proceedings.
16
  
 
In the context of the 2010 report by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-
terrorism to the UN General Assembly, the authors have taken the view that the 1267 regime 
amounts to action ultra vires, and the imposition by the Security Council of sanctions on 
individuals and entities under the system exceeds the powers conferred on the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Through the work of the 1267 Sanctions Committee, 
established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has taken on a judicial or 
quasi-judicial role, while its procedures continue to fall short of the fundamental principles of the 
right to fair trial as reflected in international human rights treaties and customary international 
law. The following section investigates in what way the 1267 regime continues, after the most 
recent round of reforms, to fall short of guaranteeing due process-related rights for individuals 
suspected of terrorism. 
 
 
2.  The Al-Qaida Sanctions List and Procedural Standards in the Office of the 
 Ombudsperson of the 1267 Committee 
 
Over the years and in response to the growing criticism of due process concerns, including from 
regional and national courts, the 1267 regime has been subject to a number of reforms by the 
Security Council, including incremental improvements for the status of affected individuals, 
such as the notification of listed individuals,
17
 the dissemination of statements and narrative 
summaries of reasons for listing
18
 and the mandatory review of all entries on the list.
19
 The 
adoption of Resolution 1904 (2009), brought about further improvements to the Committee’s 
procedures for listing and de-listing, and established an Office of the Ombudsperson to receive 
requests from individuals and entities seeking to be removed from the Consolidated List.
20
  
 
The new delisting procedures under Resolution 1904 presented a number of positive elements 
which helped ensure a greater consideration by the Committee of delisting requests, and improve 
the fairness of the system. These included the introduction of an independent and impartial 
Ombudsperson to assist the 1267 Sanctions Committee in the handling of requests for 
delisting;
21
 a greater focus on information gathering and flow of information between the 
Committee, States (including States of residence and nationality), the Ombudsperson and 
persons and entities listed, including the possibility for a direct dialogue between the 
Ombudsperson and the petitioner seeking delisting;
22
 the submission of a Comprehensive Report 
                                                          
15
 See Bardo Fassbender, ‘Targeted Sanctions and Due Process’, Study commissioned by the United Nations Office 
of Legal Affairs, Office of the Legal Counsel. (Berlin: Humboldt- Univerzität ze Berlin, 2006); Iain Cameron, ‘The 
European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism 
Sanctions’. Report commissioned by the Council of Europe, 6 February 2006, available at www.coe.int. Last 
accessed 9 September 2011.  
16
 See Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council of the European Union, European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), 3 September 2008; Sayadi and Vinck 
v. Belgium (Communication No. 1472/2006), Final Views of the Human Rights Committee, 22 October 2008. 
17
 Security Council, Resolution 1735, UN Doc. S/RES/1735 (2006), paras. 10-11. 
18
 Security Council, Resolution 1822, UN Doc, S/RES/1822 (2008), para. 12. 
19
 Security Council, Resolution 1822 (2008), paras. 25-26. See fn.18. 
20
 Security Council, Resolution 1904, UN Doc. S/RES/1904 (2009), para. 21. 
21
 Security Council, Resolution 1904 (2009), para. 21. See fn. 20.  
22
 Security Council, Resolution 1904 (2009), Annex II, para. 5. See fn. 20. 
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by the Ombudsperson to the Committee laying out the principal arguments concerning the 
delisting request;
23
 a clear timetable for the de-listing procedure, which limits the entire process 
to a maximum of 6 months; and the obligation for the Committee to provide explanatory 
comments when rejecting a delisting request
24
 and for the petitioner to be informed, to the extent 
possible, of the process and publicly releasable factual information gathered by the 
Ombudsperson.
25
 In June 2010, Ms Kimberly Prost, a Canadian judge, was appointed as 
Ombudsperson.
26
 
 
The de-listing procedures in the Office of the Ombudsperson were further improved under 
Resolution 1989 (2011), by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Office of 
the Ombudsperson for a period of 18 months and decided that, having considered requests for 
de-listing from the Al-Qaida Sanctions list, the Ombudsperson should present to the Committee 
observations and a recommendation either to retain the listing or that the Committee consider de-
listing.27 In cases where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider de-listing, 
States are required to terminate the sanctions measures against those individuals, groups, 
undertakings or entities 60 days after the Committee has considered the Comprehensive Report 
by the Ombudsperson, unless the Committee decides by consensus that the measure shall remain 
in place, or a Committee Member decides to refer the matter to the Security Council.28 Further 
Resolution 1989 provides the power to de-list also to the designating State, unless the Committee 
decides by consensus that the sanctioning measures should remain in place, or a Committee 
Member refers the matter to the Security Council, within 60 days from the de-listing request. 
Resolution 1989 thereby supplements the requirement of consensus by all Committee Members 
for delisting decisions with a new procedure, to be initiated either by the Ombudsperson or the 
designating State and which shifts the burden of consensus onto the decision to retain the 
sanctioning measures. Hence, the Ombudsperson’s recommendation or the designating State’s 
proposal to delist will by default become the decision, unless reversed by consensus. However, 
in the absence of such consensus to retaining the listing, any Member State of the Security 
Council may submit the Ombudsperson’s delisting proposal to the Security Council itself which 
will then apply its normal voting rules, including the veto power of any permanent member to 
block the delisting.29 
 
For this and a number of other reasons, the procedures for delisting under Resolution 1989 
(2011) continue to fall short of the standards required to ensure a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
30
 In particular the 1267 regime 
fails to provide individuals and entities that have been listed with the right to effective review by 
a competent and independent review mechanism; the right to counsel with respect to all 
                                                          
23
 Security Council, Resolution 1904 (2009), Annex II, para. 6(c). See fn. 20. 
24
 Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009), Annex II, para. 12. See fn. 20. 
25
 Security Council, Resolution 1904 (2009), Annex II, para. 13(b). See fn. 20.  
26
 Press release ‘Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee welcomes appointment of Judge Kimberly Prost to 
serve as ombudsperson’ 7 June 2010. Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2010/sc9947.doc.htm. Last 
accessed 9 August 2011. 
27
 Security Council Resolution 1989 (2011), para. 21. See fn. 4. 
28
 Security Council Resolution 1989 (2011), para. 23. See fn. 4. 
29
 See, Article 27, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter. 
30
 A similar assessment can be found in David Cortright and Erika de Wet, ‘Human Rights Standards for Targeted 
Sanctions’, Sanctions and Security Research Program, January 2010. Available at 
http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/10_01_HR_STANDARDS_FINAL_WEB.pdf. Last accessed 8 August 2011. 
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proceedings; and the right to an effective remedy.
31
 The Ombudsperson does not have the 
decision-making power to overturn the listing decision by the Committee and lacks the authority 
de jure to grant appropriate relief in cases where human rights have been violated, or provide 
adequate reparation, including compensation, to individuals and entities unfairly listed. While 
the Ombudsperson is given the power to make recommendations for delisting and the consensus 
requirement is likely to make it more difficult for the Committee to go against these 
recommendations, the 1267 Sanctions Committee, a political body, still retains the power to 
decide to continue the sanctioning measure, as does the Security Council. Further, access to 
information by the Ombudsperson still depends on the willingness of States to disclose 
information. While resolution 1989 strongly encourages States to provide all relevant 
information to the Ombudsperson, including confidential information if appropriate,32 States may 
still choose to withhold any information which they deem appropriate to safeguard their security 
or other interests, and there is no guarantee that the Ombudsperson will have access to the 
evidence on which the listing is based. The system continues to lack transparency as there is no 
obligation for the Committee to publish in full the Ombudsperson’s report or recommendations 
or to fully disclose information to the petitioner. Without full decision-making powers, the 
Ombudsperson cannot be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The lack of due process for individuals in 
the 1267 Regime is likely to continue to be the subject of criticism from legal commentators and 
regional and national courts alike. 
 
Earlier, the authors have developed the argument that the 1267 regime continues to be in need of 
urgent and major reform in order to solve these tensions within United Nations law.
33
 As long as 
there is no independent review of listings at the United Nations level, and in line with the 
principle that judicial or quasi-judicial decisions by the Security Council should be interpreted as 
being of a preliminary rather than a final character, it is essential that listed individuals and 
entities have access to domestic judicial review of any measure implementing the 1267 
sanctions.
34
 In its Resolution 63/185 (2009), the General Assembly urged States, ‘while ensuring 
full compliance with their international obligations’, to include ‘adequate human rights 
guarantees’ in their national procedures for the listing of terrorist individuals and entities.35  This 
statement should be seen as an appeal to States to implement sanctions against persons listed by 
the Security Council, not blindly, but subject to adequate human rights guarantees. Indirect 
review in relation to acts by an individual State or the European Union has been exercised at the 
domestic and regional levels in a number of cases, including by the Human Rights Committee in 
the case of Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium
36
 and in the judgment by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in the cases of Kadi and Al Barakaat.
37
 
 
                                                          
31 
For an overview of the applicable legal framework relating to the right to fair trial in the fight against terrorism 
see ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism’, August 2008, UN Doc. A/63/223. 
32
 Resolution 1989 (2011), para. 25. See fn. 4. 
33
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, August 2010, UN Doc. A/65/258, para. 75.  
34
 See also Martin Scheinin, ‘Is the ECJ Ruling in Kadi Incompatible with International Law?’, (2009) Yearbook of 
European Law 28. 
35
 General Assembly, Resolution 63/185 (2009), UN Doc. A/RES/63/185, para. 20. 
36
 Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium (Communication No. 1472/2006). See fn. 16. 
37
 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council. See fn. 16. 
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Despite the Security Council’s attempts to remedy the shortcomings of the 1267 sanctions 
regime, the rising tide of judicial discontent has so far not been tamed.
38
 This is evident from the 
most recent judgments by national and regional courts. 39 In A v. HM Treasury, while noting that 
the Security Council had implemented a number of procedural reforms in recent years, including 
Resolution 1904 and the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson, the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom concluded that ‘While these improvements are to be welcomed, the fact 
remains that there was not when the designations were made, and still is not, any effective 
judicial remedy’.40 Further, it noted that nothing in Resolution 1904 affected the basic problems 
that there exists no judicial procedure for review and no guarantee that individuals affected will 
have sufficient knowledge about the case against them (or even know the identity of the Member 
State which sought their designation) in order to be able to respond to it.
41
 
 
With even more open criticism of the 1267 regime and its delisting procedures, the European 
Union General Court (EGC) noted in the Kadi II judgment
42
 that ‘the Security Council has still 
not deemed it appropriate to establish an independent and impartial body responsible for hearing 
and determining, as regards matters of law and fact, actions against individual decisions taken by 
the Sanctions Committee’.43 They concluded that the current 1267 procedures cannot be equated 
with the provision of an effective judicial procedure for review of decision by the Sanctions 
Committee for a number of reasons, including that no mechanism is available to ensure that 
sufficient information be made available to the person concerned in order to allow him to defend 
himself effectively.
44
  
 
It is unlikely, but it remains to be seen whether this tide of judicial discontent will be tamed 
under the new delisting procedures of Resolution 1989 (2011). If it becomes regular practice that 
the delisting recommendations by the Ombudsperson are not contested through a consensus 
decision by the 1267 Committee or through a referral to the full Security Council and such 
consistent practice demonstrates a political commitment by States to respect the de facto decisive 
review powers of the Ombudsperson, then we consider it possible – even preferable – that 
national or EU courts will expect a listed individual or entity to seek delisting through the 
Ombudsperson before exercising a review of the merits of the implementing measure that is 
subject to their own jurisdiction. In such a scenario, national or EU courts would retain their 
jurisdiction to review the implementing measures but would grant a degree of deference by 
regarding the Ombudsperson as a remedy that should be first exhausted at the United Nations 
level. However, if Member States do not demonstrate the political commitment to respect de 
facto decisive review powers of the Ombudsperson, access to domestic or regional judicial 
review of any measure implementing the 1267 sanctions will remain the only avenue available to 
guarantee due process-related rights for listed individuals. The analysis of the recent Kadi II 
judgment by the EGC in the following section illustrates how this path too poses a number of 
challenges, which also point in the direction of a political solution. 
                                                          
38
 See also Jared Genser and Kate Bath, ‘When Due Process Concerns Become Dangerous: The Security Council’s 
1267 Regime and the Need for Reform’, (2010) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 33, p. 
22. 
39
 See also Cian Murphy, 'Case-Note on Mollendorf & Mollendorf, M v HM Treasury & Criminal Proceedings 
Against E & F' (2011) 48(1) Common Market Law Review. 
40
 Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC), [2010] UKSC 2, para. 78. 
41
 Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC), para. 239. See fn. 40. 
42
 Case T-85/09, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission, General Court of the European Union, 30 
September 2010. 
43
 Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Commission, para. 128. See fn. 42. 
44
 Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Commission, para. 128. See fn. 42.  
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3.  Kadi II and the Issue of Disclosure of Evidence 
 
The Kadi ‘saga’ has brought to the forefront the issue of due process in the 1267 Sanctions 
regime, and has been the subject of wide discussions by legal scholars.
45
 While the Kadi II 
judgment by the EGC broadly follows the ECJ’s path, it deserves further consideration as it 
raises a number of important questions which go to the heart of the problems inherent in the 
1267 listings and their judicial review. In particular, the EGC explicitly addressed the much 
debated issue of preventative versus punitive nature of the sanctions and the even more thorny 
issue of disclosure of the evidence on which a particular blacklisting is based.  
 
As is well known, in 2005 the Court of First Instance (CFI) had rejected the challenge by Kadi 
and Al Barakaat to their listing by arguing that there had been no violation of jus cogens norms 
and the CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of blacklisting decisions.
46
 In 
2008, the ECJ overturned the decision and held that EU Courts must ensure the full review of the 
lawfulness of all Community acts, including those implementing Security Council resolutions, to 
ensure their compliance with fundamental rights.
47
 In doing so, the ECJ created a kind of 
‘Solange’ situation through making a distinction between the imposition of sanctions by the 
Security Council through the listing of terrorists and their implementation at the regional or 
national level.
48
 The ECJ ruled that at the implementation level there had been a violation of the 
rights of the defence, the right to be heard and the right to effective judicial review.
49
 The ECJ’s 
decision was important in highlighting the need for judicial review of national or EU level listing 
decisions, in the absence of adequate procedures at UN level and came to constitute perhaps the 
strongest challenge to the legitimacy of the UN sanctions regime and catalyst for subsequent 
reforms.
50
 
 
Subsequent to the ECJ ruling in Kadi I, in 2008, a new regulation maintaining the freeze of Mr 
Kadi’s funds was adopted by the European Commission,51 which Mr Kadi sought to annul 
before the EGC. In September 2010, the Court found that the regulation was adopted in breach 
                                                          
45
 For an overview see Sara Poli and Maria Tzanou, ‘The Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the Literature’, (2009) 
Yearbook of European Law 28(1). 
46
 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, European Court of First Instance, 21 September 2005. 
47
 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat .v. Council. See fn. 16. 
48
 As proposed by Advocate General Miguel Poiares Maduro in his opinion in Kadi (Case C-402/05 P Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of AG 
Maduro, 16 January 2008, para. 38 and fn. 46) who on this point referred to an earlier report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 
(August 2006): ‘The Special Rapporteur is of the view that if there is no proper or adequate international review 
available, national review procedures — even for international lists — are necessary. These should be available in 
the states that apply the sanctions’ (UN Doc. A/61/267, para. 39).  
49
 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council, paras. 348-349. See fn. 16. 
50
 Blacklisted: Targeted sanctions, preemptive security and fundamental rights, Report by the European Center for 
Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), December 2010, p. 61; for a discussion of the role of EU Courts in the 
exercise of judicial control of terrorist listings by the UN see also A. Rosas, ‘Terrorist Listings and the Rule of Law: 
the Role of the EU Courts’, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2011/31. Available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/GGP/Documents/Publications/WorkingPapers/RSCAS201131-AllanRosas.pdf. Last 
accessed 2 August 2011. 
51
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008.  
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of Mr Kadi’s rights of defence, right to effective judicial review and right to property and once 
again annulled the regulation in so far as it concerned Mr Kadi. In this decision, the EGC has 
been seen as ‘grudgingly’ following the decision by the ECJ while not appearing to be 
completely comfortable with it.
52
 In fact, the Court opened its reasoning by highlighting a 
number of criticisms, which have been raised by the institutions and intervening governments 
and voiced in legal circles in response to the ECJ’s judgment, and which it explicitly stated ‘are 
not entirely without foundation’.53 These criticisms included the risk that the UN Sanctions 
regime would be disrupted if judicial review were instituted at the national or regional level;
54
 
that such judicial review is liable to encroach on the Security Council’s prerogatives;55 that it 
may not be wholly consistent with international law
56
 and that although the ECJ did not intend to 
challenge the primacy of Security Council resolutions, the necessary consequence of such a 
judgment would be to render that primacy ineffective in the Community legal order.
57
 The EGC 
however concluded that, despite the complexities linked to the ECJ judgment, it was not 
advisable for the Court to revisit points of law which had been decided by the ECJ.
58
  
 
After its somewhat insubordinate opening, the EGC nonetheless went on to detail the full 
consequences of the ECJ findings and took it upon itself to ‘ensure ‘in principle the full review’ 
of the lawfulness of the contested regulation in light of fundamental rights’.59 Such a review, it 
argued, is all the more justified when considering the draconian nature and long-lasting effects of 
fund-freezing measures on the fundamental rights of the person concerned: 
 
In the scale of a human life, 10 years in fact represent a substantial period of time and the 
question of the classification of the measures in question as preventative or punitive, 
protective or confiscatory, civil or criminal seems now to be an open one.
60
  
 
This is in line with the view taken by the second author in the context of his mandate as UN 
Special Rapporteur and in other forums: because of the indefinite freezing of the assets of those 
listed, the 1267 listings amount to ‘a criminal charge’ under international human rights law 
owing to the severity of the sanctions.
61
 
 
The Court went on to conclude that, in light of the lack of an effective judicial procedure for 
review of decisions of the Sanctions Committee at the UN level, and despite the creation of the 
Office of the Ombudsperson, ‘the review carried out by the Community judicature of 
Community measures to freeze funds can be regarded as effective only if it concerns, indirectly, 
                                                          
52
 ‘Case T-85/09, Kadi II’ post by T. Stahlberg on ECJBlog.com, 26 October 2010. Available at 
http://courtofjustice.blogspot.com/2010/10/case-t-8509-kadi-ii.html. Last accessed 9 September 2011. 
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 Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Commission, para. 121. See fn. 42. 
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 Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Commission, para. 113. See fn. 42. 
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See fn. 16) the same Committee considered that the sanctions imposed under Resolution 1267 did not constitute a 
criminal charge.  
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the substantive assessments of the Sanctions Committee itself and the evidence underlying 
them’.62  
 
The most problematic issue which emerges from the General Court’s judgment lies in the issue 
of disclosure of evidence, which goes to the heart of the legal problems resulting from the 1267 
regime. As pointed out by the ECJ, when dealing with issues of national security and terrorism, 
the courts must apply techniques which accommodate, on one hand, legitimate security concerns 
about the nature and sources of information, and on the other the need to accord the individual a 
sufficient measure of procedural justice.
63
 However in Kadi II, the EGC concluded that it must 
be able to review the lawfulness and merits of Community measures to freeze funds without it 
being possible to raise objections that the evidence and information used by the competent 
Community institution is secret or confidential.  Furthermore ‘the Community judicature must 
not only establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent, 
but must also ascertain whether that evidence contains all the relevant information to be taken 
into account in order to assess the situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it.’64   
 
The extent and intensity of the judicial review carried out by the EGC are those set out in the 
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI) case,65 which is indirectly endorsed by 
the ECJ.
66
 The OMPI listing resulted from the EU’s implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 1373, which requested all UN Member States to implement a number of binding 
obligations intended to enhance their legal and institutional ability to counter terrorist activities 
nationally and internationally, including by freezing the funds of persons who commit or attempt 
to commit terrorist acts.
67
 Listing under the 1373 regime differs from the 1267 regime in that 
lists are decentralised and administered at the regional and national level through autonomous 
sanctions lists.  In the OMPI case, the Court held that the judicial review of the lawfulness of a 
Community decision to freeze funds extends to the assessment of the facts and circumstances 
relied on as justifying it, and to the evidence and information on which the assessment is based.
68
 
While the OMPI case admits that the use of confidential information may be necessary, this does 
not imply that national authorities are free from any review by national courts. The OMPI case 
did not however rule on the separate question of whether the applicant and/or his/her/its lawyers 
could be provided with evidence alleged to be confidential, or whether they could be or had to be 
provided only to the Court.
69
 
 
On this basis, the EGC went on to find that Mr. Kadi was not allowed even the most minimal 
access to the evidence against him and that no balance had been struck between his interests and 
the need to protect the confidential nature of the information. The EGC argued that ‘the few 
pieces of information and imprecise allegations in the summary of reasons appear clearly 
insufficient to enable the applicant to be able to launch an effective challenge to the allegations 
against him’.70 The EGC applied the same criteria as the European Court of Human Rights in the 
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A. and Others v. United Kingdom case,
71
 that held that the guarantee of procedural fairness under 
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires providing an opportunity to 
effectively challenge allegations, and as a general rule requires that all the evidence against a 
person be disclosed. Limitations on the right to disclosure of all material may be possible for 
important public interest matters, provided the person still has the possibility to effectively 
challenge the allegations against him. This is not the case if the disclosed material consists 
purely in general assertions and the decision is based solely, or to a decisive degree, on 
undisclosed material. Therefore, given that the contested regulation was adopted without any real 
guarantee being given as to the disclosure of the evidence used against the applicant or as to his 
actually being properly heard in that regard, the General Court concluded that the rights of the 
defence were not observed, which resulted in the principle of effective judicial protection also 
being infringed.
72
 
 
However the EGC briefly noted in a couple of paragraphs one of the most sensitive issues 
inherent in the 1267 sanctions regime. While certain restrictions to the disclosure of full 
evidence to the applicant may be conceivable— and which may allow for the reproduction of 
truncated evidence or the use of special advocates as the European Court of Human Rights has 
allowed in particular circumstances
73— what happens in cases where the Court does not have 
access to the gist of the evidence either? The Court of First Instance had already found in 
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) II that the refusal by the Council and the 
French authorities to communicate even to the Court alone certain information on which the 
decision to freeze the funds was based, had the consequence that the court was unable to review 
the lawfulness of contested regulation, and as a result the applicant’s right to effective judicial 
protection had been violated.
74
 In paragraph 182, the EGC notes that the infringement of the 
right to effective review was not remedied in the course of the legal action by Mr Kadi. ‘Indeed, 
given that, according to the fundamental position adopted by the Commission and supported by 
the Council and the intervening governments, no information or evidence of that kind may be the 
subject of investigation by the Community judicature, those institutions have adduced no 
information to that end’.75 
 
The question is not only whether the EU administrative organs will be more cooperative in the 
future and be more willing to provide the thrust of the case to the court, but whether this 
information is actually available to the EU or national courts to be able to exercise effective 
judicial review. As noted in other contexts,
76
 the listings are often the result of political decisions 
taken by the diplomatic representatives of States within political bodies, based on classified 
information not necessarily evenly shared between the deciding States. De Wet has suggested 
that the solution to the problem would largely depend on the willingness of the 1267 Sanctions 
Committee to provide the courts with the relevant information and be willing to give deference 
to those courts. ‘For the time being,’ she argues ‘the jury is still out on whether the attempts of 
the ECJ and domestic courts will encounter (extensive) cooperation at the level of the Sanctions 
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Committees’,77 but unless the 1267 Sanctions Committee admits for the disclosure of evidence 
to the courts, effective judicial review may be inherently impossible.  
 
However, we are afraid that the problem goes even further than this. Reports of the 1267 
Sanctions Committee’s practice indicate that the Committee itself does not have access to the 
evidence and the listing of individuals on the basis of undisclosed intelligence.
78
 Such 
intelligence may be discussed bilaterally between concerned Member States of the Security 
Council in advance of reaching consensus on a particular listing but is actually not presented 
collectively to the 1267 Committee as a whole. Unfortunately, the EU Commission or Council 
cannot share with the EU Courts evidence that they do not possess, and the 1267 Committee of 
the Security Council cannot share with the EU evidence it does not possess. 
 
Although the EGC is insisting on the same level of protection of procedural rights, a 
fundamental difference exists in the possibility for judicial review of cases listed under the 1267 
regime (e.g. Kadi) and those listed under the 1373 regime (e.g. OMPI). While the independent 
listing and de-listing responsibility of States and the EU under the 1373 regime allows them 
discretion to balance potential conflicts between human rights and security considerations,
79
 
things are more complicated at the level of the 1267 regime.  In particular, when the designating 
State at UN level is not the same as that in which the measure is implemented and whose 
domestic court is to provide judicial review, the availability of the evidence necessary for 
engaging in a merits based review may prove impossible.
80
 The problems inherent in a system 
based on secret intelligence appear ever more pressing in light of the judicial challenges which it 
is facing. There are very basic questions surrounding the disclosure of evidence in the 1267 
Committee: Who has the evidence? Who can the evidence be shared with? Who can review the 
evidence? Will courts or the Ombudsperson ever be guaranteed full access to the gist of the 
evidence? And if so, will the 1267 Sanctions Committee accept their de-listing 
recommendations? Unless these questions are asked, and answered, it is difficult to see how 
effective independent review will ever be possible for an unaccountable body, shrouded in 
secrecy, like the 1267 Sanctions Committee. 
 
There is, however, a political solution to the dilemma. Currently there are four EU Member 
States that serve on the Security Council and its 1267 Committee: the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and Portugal. As the first two are permanent members; there is no composition of the 
Security Council that would not include at least two EU Member States. If the issue of disclosure 
of information is taken seriously, the EU members of the Security Council will need to block any 
listing proposal made to the 1267 Committee, where the proposing State does not accept the 
disclosure of information used for the listing decision in a manner that will enable the EU courts 
to exercise judicial review over the implementation of the resulting sanctions to a degree that is 
acceptable to these courts. In our view, however, they should be prepared to accept a more 
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modest degree of disclosure than the sharing of all evidence with the listed individual or entity, 
and it will be a task for the ECJ to determine the required level. 
  
This political solution, coupled with the new de-listing procedures under Security Council 
resolution 1989 (2011), which requires delisting decisions made by the Ombudsperson or the 
designating State to be implemented after 60 days unless the listing is renewed by consensus by 
the Committee or referred to the Security Council, could provide a way out of the ‘Kadi II 
conundrum’ outlined above. Again the EU members on the Security Council would need to 
block any proposal made to retain a listing which the Ombudsperson has recommended should 
be terminated and where the proposing State does not accept the disclosure of information used 
for the listing decision in a manner that will enable the EU courts to exercise judicial review over 
the implementation of the resulting sanctions, to a degree that is acceptable to these courts. 
 
A number of problems linked to the 1267 Security Council sanctions regime are discussed in this 
essay. While the Security Council has assumed a judicial or quasi-judicial role in imposing 
sanctions on individuals and entities under the 1267 sanctions regime, its procedures continue to 
fall short of guaranteeing due-process related rights for individuals suspected of terrorism. These 
shortcomings have not been remedied by the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson of 
the 1267 Committee— as is evident also from recent judgments by national and regional 
courts—nor by the recent reforms to the delisting procedures prescribed by Resolution 1989 
(2011). The analysis of the Kadi II judgement by the ECG contained in this essay highlights 
further difficulties linked to the judicial review of measures implementing the 1267 sanctions. 
The current practice by the 1267 Committee of listing individuals on the basis of undisclosed 
intelligence may, in fact, makes it impossible for national or regional courts (EU courts in the 
case of Mr. Kadi) to have access to the evidence that would be necessary to engage in a full 
merits based review. While the 1267 regime in its current form continues to be in need of urgent 
reform, the authors have suggested a political solution by which EU Member States sitting on the 
Security Council could require the disclosure of information used for listing decisions in order to 
enable EU courts to exercise judicial review over the implementation of the resulting sanctions 
to a degree that is acceptable to these courts.  
 
